networks in traditional hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies and modern post-industrial societies seems to be that, in traditional societies, everyone in the community has more or less the same network of 150 acquaintances, whereas in modern urban societies our networks are highly fragmented -my 150 consists of a set of subnetworks that barely overlap. You and I may share one small set of friends, say through work, but there is no overlap at all in the remaining subsets -we do not share any relatives, nor do we share hobby circles, church networks, spouses' friends, schoolgate friends (the often temporary friendships built up through one's children's school friends) or sports club friends. Networks in modern societies are fragmented and dispersed (often over considerable geographical distances), whereas in traditional societies they typically form a single cohesive community -even though that community itself may be distributed over a wide geographical area (as in many contemporary hunter-gatherers).
This figure of ~150 seems to mark a distinct limit for relationship quality: there seems to be a marked difference in the quality of the relationships we have with those who are inside the chosen circle versus those who are outside. My informal definition for this limit to our social world is that it is everybody whom we know as persons, everyone with whom we have a definable personal relationship. Those inside this circle are individuals towards whom we feel some sense of obligation, whom we trust would help us out if we so requested, who would reciprocate our sense of personal commitment.
We know where these individuals fit into our network of relationships, they know where we fit into theirs, and our knowledge in both cases is based on personal acquaintance. Sometimes, that knowledge can be indirect (friends of friends, or a shared grandparent), but it defines those to whom we owe personal obligations; if we offend them, or spurn them in some way, that offence will come to haunt us through the effect it has on the relationships that link us. In contrast, beyond this circle of 150, people cease to be individuals, at least in so far as our relationships are concerned. Even though we recognise them as individuals (i.e. we can put names to faces), our relationships with them are less personal and more typological. We need rules of thumb to guide our interactions with them rather than being able to rely on personalised knowledge. In such cases, the rule is usually cued by some appropriate badge that signifies the status of an individual and how we should address them -uniforms, badges of rank, styles of speech, and so on.
As with all primate social groups, human social networks are highly structured. We do not interact equally with all members of our immediate social world. Rather, it seems that our social world consists of a series of hierarchically inclusive circles of acquaintanceship that are reflected in both the perceived intimacy of the relationship and the frequency of interaction. These circles of acquaintanceship seem to have a very consistent structure: each annulus includes about twice as many people as the one immediately inside it, so that the cumulative numbers of individuals included in successive circles exhibit a constant scaling ratio of approximately 3. Roughly speaking, they progressively include 5, 15, 50, 150, 500 and 1500 individuals, and, for all we know, may extend beyond that in a further series of circles that have the same ratios.
The Role of Cognition
The fact that brain size correlates with social group size implies that this involves a cognitive limit. in considerable depth. In simple terms, it is the cognitive rubicon that children pass through at about the age of 4-5 years, although some individuals (such as autistic people) never achieve this even as adults.
However, the problem with theory of mind is that while we know a great deal about its natural history, we have almost no idea what it actually is.
Nonetheless, even though the exact processes involved may be somewhat opaque, we can perhaps use the notion of intentionality to give us some purchase on the problem of how humans differ from other primates since the orders of intentionality form a natural scale, and thus seem to provide us with an index of social cognitive competence (as indexed by the ability to hold several individuals' mental states in mind at the same time).
This being so, our main interest at this point is what the natural limits of intentional reasoning might be in humans. We have tested normal adults in a number of separate studies, and it seems that the limit of function for adults is consistently fifth order ('I believe that you suppose that I imagine that you want me to believe that…'). Around two-thirds of individuals have their limit at or below fifth order intentionality, and around three-quarters have their limit at or below sixth order.
These competencies develop over a period of time between age 5
(when children first acquire theory of mind, or second order intentionality) and the early teens (when they finally acquire fifth order adult-level competencies).
Intentionality and the Virtual World
The issue of interest here is what can be achieved with different levels of intentionality. If intentional competencies allow us to hold several different individuals' mind states in mind at the same time, then it seems likely that it will impose constraints on cultural phenomena that require us to think intentionally. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of imaginative play. The psychologist Alan Leslie noted that theory of mind may be crucial for children to be able to engage in fictive (i.e. pretend) play where they have to imagine that the world is other than it really is (i.e. dolls can drink tea, the steering wheel on the back of a chair is a real car). Leslie's point can be extended to drama.
WHY HUMANS AREN'T JUST GREAT APES
Consider the case of the audience watching Shakespeare's Othello (Figure 3) . They have to believe that Iago intends that Othello imagines that Desdemona is in love with Cassio, an activity involving four levels of intentionality. However, notice that, at this point, the kind of story they are dealing with is not especially demanding (or, for that matter, particularly enthralling course, the audience is having to work at fifth order intentionality, and is thus at the natural limits for the great majority of the population.
But, in putting this story together, Shakespeare himself has to go one level higher than his audience, to sixth order: he has to intend that the audience believes…. I suggest that this might explain why the capacity to enjoy good literature is a widespread human universal, but the ability to compose good literature is not -storytelling demands social cognitive competencies that are beyond the normal range for the great majority of the population. Thus it is that, when we sit down to write those novels we have so long aspired to write, our natural limits at fifth order intentionality constrain most of us into writing dull narratives.
Lucy to Language
Robin The full text of this lecture will be published in Proceedings of the British Academy, volume 154. 
